Price expectations play a critical role in commodity markets where producers must make input decisions well before output is realized. This paper brings together alternative expectations regimes, their estimation, and hypothesis tests for use in structural commodity models to determine their use by commodity producers. Extrapolative mechanisms and rational expectations are considered under risk neutrality and risk aversion. The assumptions implicit in the use of aggregate data in these models are made explicit. Structural models using individual survey data are discussed. While Muth's rational expectations hypothesis has found widespread acceptance in the macroeconomic literature, empirical results from industry studies indicate that commodity producers may have heterogeneous price expectations, with no single expectations hypothesis dominating. This is not surprising given that different producers possess different information and have different costs associated with information collection and processing.
Commodity production typically involves a time diction error, which at least some astute producers lag between input application and output realiza-should be able to profitably exploit. Second, price tion. As a result, producers must base production prediction errors should be uncorrelated with the decisions on known input prices and their output information set available at the time of the foreprice forecasts. Economists have hypothesized cast. If the prediction error is correlated with any alternative price expectation regimes, mainly na-variable in the information set, the forecaster has ive expectations, adaptive expectations, quasi-not made efficient use of all available information. rational, and rational expectations. However, since While the rational expectations hypothesis has Muth's seminal paper (1961) , economists have de-obvious appeal from an economist's perspective, it voted increasing attention to developing economet-is not without fault. The rational expectations hyric models compatible with his rational expecta-pothesis implicitly assumes information is scarce tions hypothesis. Muth's hypothesis is appealing yet costless to obtain and process (Feige and because it treats information like any other input in Pearce 1976; Arrow 1978; Grossman and Stiglitz a firm's production process: producers are hypoth-1976). When information collection and processesized to use available information efficiently in ing is costly, producers' optimal forecasts may informing their predictions of future prices. This hy-volve simplistic rules, resulting in possibly biased pothesis has important implications. First, produc-and inefficient forecasts of future prices. With posers' predictions of future prices should be unbi-itive information costs, any number of expectaased; otherwise, there would be a systematic pre-tions regimes may reflect the true underlying price forecasting model used by producers. Indeed, when the cost of forecasting is positive, rational Senior authorship is not assigned. utility maximizing agents will choose to use a sim-Diana M. Burton is assistant professor, Department of Forest Science, per expectations mechanism, like naive expectaand H. Alan Love is associate professor, Department of Agricultural the inaccuracies Economics, Texas A&M University. This manuscript reports research tions, if the losses incurred due to the inaccuracies conducted by the Texas Agricultural Experiment Station, the Texas of the expectations are less than the expected net A&M University System. The authors thank the Nordic Risk Project for benefit from a more accurate but tly, petapartial funding of this research. They also thank participants of the benefit from a more accurate, but costly, expecta-Nordic Risk Project and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments.
tions mechanism (Evans and Ramey 1992).
This paper reviews alternative expectations rewhere error term v t -(0,ao2), 0o and oa are pagimes, their estimation, and the hypothesis tests rameters, and ot 2 is a vector of parameters for input that have been applied to determine their accepprices w _ 1 . Since output price Pt is unknown at tance among producers. We distinguish between time t -1, farmers must form price expectations. the usual case where producers' expectations are Expected price -_ ut is formed at time t -1 for not directly observable and the case where expectime t, given available information at time t -1: tations have been revealed through survey panel data. Empirical results from industry studies with (2) t--P = Et-l(Ptl[ t-), implicit price expectations indicate commodity where E t _ (.) is the expectations operator condiproducers may have heterogeneous price expecta-tional on the information set flt_ available at tions. This is not surprising given that different time t -1. producers possess different information and have At time t, processors of agricultural output base different costs associated with information collectheir demand yt on known product price Pt, a vection and processing. To investigate the possibility tor of known output prices z t and a vector of of heterogeneous expectations, we turn to studies known prices for other inputs into the production that use panel survey data of individual's price process u,: expectations. Results from these studies are also ()
inconclusive. For the most part, panel survey studies have focused exclusively on testing the rational where error term vD -(0, orD), o3 and p1 are expectations hypothesis. The limited focus of these parameters, and p2 and 13 are parameter vectors studies results, in part, from the kinds of hypothcorresponding to output price vector z, and other esis tests that are available using only survey data. processing costs vector ut, respectively. The sup-In the future, an alternative hypothesis test strategy ply and demand equations can be estimated as a that combines observed firm level data with survey system only if price expectations are directly obdata could be used to distinguish producers' adher-served. For now, we assume that producers' exence to alternative price expectations mechanisms. pected output prices are not observed.
A Simple Aggregate Model with Unobserved Extrapolative Expectations Models Price Expectations
Extrapolative price expectations models formulate In this section, we specify a simple model of farm expected price as a function of only past prices. supply and processor demand for an agricultural There are a number of variations. commodity. While we model an agricultural commodity, the methods could be applied to any re-Naive Expectations source or product that involves a time lag between input decisions and output realization. We pre-The earliest expectations models simply assumed sume farmers' supply decisions are made under that the best forecast of future price is current uncertainty while processors decisions are not. In price: naive expectations principle, any model should capture farmers' atti-(4) tt = Pttudes toward risk regardless of the expectations mechanism. Early models, including Muth's ratio-Naive expectations implicitly assume that the unnal expectations model (1961) , used a certainty-derlying prce seres follows a random walk: equivalent framework and implicitly assumed risk (5) p" = Pt-+ e, neutrality. For now, we will also utilize the certainty equivalent assumption.
where et is an error term. This simple model pre-Consider a market characterized by aggregate sumes that price at production planning time consupply and demand equations. Stocks are assumed tains all the information from which astute producto be inconsequential, or unchanging from period ers could profit. It ignores possible producer to period, and hence to have no effect on equilib-knowledge of anticipated supply or demand shifts rium price. Competitive farmers are assumed to and their effects on price. In addition, in the presallocate inputs with price vector, w, _ i at time t -ence of upward or downward price trends, the na-1 to produce output yt at time t. Aggregate supply ive expectations mechanism will continuously unis given by der-or overpredict future price. Econometric Estimation. Assuming the naive (1) yt = to + ol t -lPt + o2 wt-+ vt, price expectation holds, unknown model parame-ters can be estimated by substituting equation (4) (7) ys = into supply equation (1) and estimating the result-s + -X)+ _t(1 -)p ing supply equation using OLS. However, if sup-+ -+,_ + s, ply and demand errors are correlated, OLS will2 t result in biased and inconsistent estimates. In that where v t = vs -Xv_ 1. If equation (7) is esticase, consistent and asymptotically efficient pa-mated OLS, resulting parameter estimates will be rameter estimates can be obtained applying three-biased and inconsistent since yS_ is correlated stage least squares or full-information maximum with the autocorrelated disturbance '. However, it likelihood estimation to the supply and demand is possible to obtain consistent, though not effiequations. Serially correlated errors in equation (5) cient, estimates using the instrumental variable can also result in biased and inconsistent OLS pa-method with w t _ 2 serving as an instrument for rameter estimates. Consistent estimates can be ob-yS_ . (For estimation details, see Johnston 1984, tained using an instrumental variable estimator ch. 9.) (see Johnston 1984, ch. 9) .
A maximum likelihood (ML) estimator is also Literature. While widely criticized, naive ex-available, which gives consistent and efficient papectations are often presumed when researchers re-rameter estimates. To develop the ML estimator, quire a simple price expectations mechanism to rewrite equation (6) as the infinite geometrically complete a model specification. Focused on other decreasing series economic questions, many researchers ignore the-)) potential effects of the chosen expectations mech-(8) t (1 - The adaptive expectations model is well known but
regarded as a rather ad hoc expectations process i=o i=t (Nerlove 1972) . Expected price in the next period The first right-hand term is historic prices and is is formed by adjusting expected price by a propor-observabe. The second right-hand term represents tion of the error made in predicting the current expected price at t = . It involves data predating period's price (Hicks 1939; Koyck 1954 ; Cagan time period t = 0 and, hence, is not observable. 1956 ; Muth 1960; Nerlove 1958) :
The second right-hand term can be rewritten as e---e~X_`'E(po -uL) = X t ' where p is the mean of the (6) t-iPts t-i-2Pt-\ -price series pt and 8 = E(p o -R). 8 can be treated as an additional parameter to be estimated.
(I -X)(Pt_ -t-2Pt-)The first right-hand term of equation (9) can be where (1 -X) is the forecast adjustment factor. If rewritten as an observable variable g,: X = 1, a price expectation never changes, regardless of past prediction error or any other informa-ttion. If X = 0, the adaptive expectation model is ( gt = (1 -x)pt-i. equivalent to the naive expectation model. If 0 < i=o X < 1, price expectations are adjusted each period by some proportion of the discrepancy between the Given a value of X, a data series for expected price latest price and the price expectation formed for can be built up recursively as: that period. If price is trending upward, the adap-g = (1--)p tive expectations model will continuously underpredict future prices. If price is trending down-(11) g 2 = (1 -X)(p 2 + p) ward, future prices will be overpredicted. Like the g3 = ( -)(p3 + 2 + 2p).
naive expectations mechanism, adaptive expectations do not account for the fountain of other in-This allows supply, equation (1), to be rewritten as formation available to economic agents. (12) y = o + a(g, + '8) Econometric Estimation. Supply, equation (7), '+ l tw + vs is obtained by applying the Koyck transformation 2 W to expected price, equation (6), and substituting Assuming v t -N(0,uc2), maximum likelihood esthe result into equation (1), giving timation proceeds with a grid search on X over the interval 0 -X -1. For each specified value of X, variables. Estimation of rational distributed lag OLS is performed on equation (12) to obtain the models is discussed in Jorgenson (1966) and in supply parameters. Standard errors can be com- Maddala and Rao (1971) . puted for X and all other estimated parameters from Under the quasi-rational expectations hypothethe information matrix (Johnston 1984, 359) . Alsis, agents form future value forecasts from an opternative estimation procedures are available if the timal statistical predictor such as an autoregressive supply error term vs is serially correlated or if the integrated moving-average predictor or a simple supply model contains lagged dependent variables vector autoregression. Agents are not required to (Johnston 1984, ch. 9; Doran 1988) .
know structural parameters for the entire economic Literature. Adaptive expectations models have model, as they would be under the full rational been widely used and were formalized by Nerlove expectations hypothesis (Nelson and Bessler (1958) . Askari and Cummings (1977) provide an 1992). Friedman (1978) , Wallis (1980) , and extensive survey of applications of adaptive expec-Bessler (1980, 1982) , show that the adaptive extations models in the literature. More recently, pectations model can be represented as an ARIMA Shonkwiler and Hinckley (1985) have utilized (0,1,1) model, and as such, the adaptive expectaadaptive expectations to model feeder cattle martions model is a member of the quasi-rational exkets; Phillip and Abalu (1987) consider price expectations family. pectations of Nigerian farmers; Doran (1988) esis asserts that "the economy generally does not =0o
waste information, and that expectations depend specifically on the structure of the entire system' where 0j are fixed weights (Nerlove 1983) . Other (Muth 1961, 315) . Specifically, the rational expecextrapolative expectations models include Almon tations hypothesis maintains that firms' subjective distributed lag models (Almon 1965), rational disexpectations should be distributed about the objectributed lag models (Jorgenson, 1966) , and quasitive predicted outcomes from economic theory. rational expectations models (Nerlove 1967 ; This implies that rational expectations are "model Nerlove, Grether, and Carvalho 1979; Nelson and consistent" forward-looking projections of vari-Bessler 1992).
ables. In practice, empirical rational expectations Almon distributed lag models, also known as models equate individual subjective expectations polynomial distributed lag models, approximate to the objective expectation generated from the the true distribution of lag coefficients with lowmodel and, as a result, are not invariant to model order polynomial functions of lagged variables, specification. This reduces the number of lag parameters that Specification of a rational-expectations-based must be estimated, reducing the problem of muleconometric model requires deriving a price exticollinearity associated with estimating long lag pectation function that can be substituted into the functions (Almon 1965). Good review essays on supply equation. Given information available distributed lag models are Almon (1965), Griliches when production plans are implemented, a typical (1967), and Nerlove (1972) . The Almon lag strucsupplier formulates expectations of future prices ture is used in Schmidt and Waud (1973) .
such that his subjective expected price equals the A rational distributed lag function is one that can price that equates demand and supply when output be written as the ratio of two polynomials: one is realized. polynomial with a finite number of lags in the de-Following Wallis (1980), Goodwin and Sheffrin pendent variable and another for the independent (1982), and Huntzinger (1979) , we can write the supply and demand equations given in (1) By, + At,_-+ iw,_ + F 2 X = Vt, the structural supply and demand, equation (14).
where A, B, r, and r 2 are matrices of parameters, Combining terms involving w t _ gives 0-Al
Econometric Estimation y' = (yt pt) is a vector of the endogenous output Equation (18) represents a system of simultaneous and price variables, t_ y is a vector of the expec-equations. Wegge and Feldman (1983) have tation variables for output and price, w t _ is a shown that econometric identification of paramevector of exogenous supply variables with values ters in rational expectations models of this form is known at time t -1, and x; = (z', u') is a vector guaranteed by the traditional rank and order conof exogenous demand variables with future values ditions, so long as the number of imperfectly annot known at time t -1. We will assume that ticipated exogenous variables (elements in xt) is errors across equations may be contemporaneously not less than the number of equations (elements correlated, but that errors are not correlated across in yt). Assuming the errors v t are independent of time periods. Thus, E(Vt) = 0 and E(VtV = X. the vt, unknown parameters can be jointly esti-Solving equation (14) for yt gives mated using nonlinear full-information maximum-likelihood estimation procedures with cross- ( and (18) (Wallis 1980; Taylor 1979; Fair and Taylor 1983; Revankar 1980) . Equation (15) represents reduced form supply and lr 1983; Revankar 1980). demand equations. However, this formulation still Whle elements in 4 can be esimated as addinvolves unobserved expected prices and quantities tional parameters in (8), as just describedo forefor pt, yt, and x~, at time t -1. We can replace parameters in the stochastic process used to forefor Pt, yt, and x t , at time t-1. We can replace cast exogenous demand variables are estimated these unobserved variables by taking the condi-cast exogenous demand variables are estimated tional expectation as of time t -1 (E~t -) of both separately, with resulting predictions being used as tional expectation as of time t -1 (E,_,) of both ^ ^ ^ g ^ Nonlinear maximumsides of equation (15) and substitutingfor instruments for EIx. Nonlinear maximusidese for likelihood estimation is then applied to the simpli-Et-it This results in fied version of (18). Pagan (1984) develops a two-(16) t-_ly = -(A + B)-rw t _ i stage estimation procedure that can be used to ob--(A + B) -lr 2 E t_ xt.
tain consistent estimates of both parameters and their estimated covariances.
Step 1 of the two-step Equation (16) gives the expected price and quan-estimator consists of running regression (17) to get tity in period t, given information available at time i, then substituting y, for _ Iy and x, for E,_ Ix t -1, as a function of the model's structural pa-i (16) and using OLS fitted values to get , rameters, known exogenous supply variables, and Step 2 consists of substituting _ 1-for,_ iy for x forecasts of exogenous demand variables for pe-f E__ x in (15) and estimating (15) using tworiod t. This equation represents producers' rational stage least squares, including ,_ among the price expectations function.
instrumental variables. Although this approach To cast the rational price expectations function sacrifices efficiency, it reduces the number of nonentirely in terms of observable values, it remains to linear parameters that must be simultaneously esspecify producers' expectations of exogenous de-timated and therefore simplifies estimation. Hoffmand variables, Et_ ix. A common procedure is to man (1987) has extended Pagan's estimation prospecify producers' expectations of exogenous vari-cedure to the multiple equation model. Gauger ables as low-order autoregressions:
(1989) has expanded Pagan's work to analyze the effects of generated regressors on inference in hypothesis testing. The two estimation approaches (17) xit 4tijXit-j + it, just described are often referred to as the "substi-j=1 tution method" because they substitute an expres-sion for expected price directly into the structural Literature model (Wickens 1982) . Fair and Taylor (1983) present an iterative Agricultural models estimated presuming the simmethod for obtaining maximum-likelihood param-ple rational price expectations model just described eter estimates in nonlinear rational expectations include Huntzinger (1979) , Goodwin and Sheffrin models. Fair and Taylor's estimation procedure re-(1982), Shonkwiler and Emerson (1982) , Eckstein places the rational price expectation function with (1984) , Giles, Goss, and Chin (1985) , and Tepredicted values created from numerical model so-gene, Huffman, and Miranowski (1988) . Huntzlutions. Starting with a set of consistent parameter inger estimates a rational expectations model of the estimates, the model is solved using an iterative U.S. broiler market using the errors-in-variables solution method. Resulting price predictions are method suggested by McCallum (1976 McCallum ( , 1979 . then substituted for expected price, and model Giles, Goss, and Chin use McCallum's errors-inparameters are reestimated using maximum-like-variables method to estimate simultaneous equalihood estimation procedures. The solution-tions models of the U.S. corn and soybean marestimation process continues until parameter kets, assuming producers follow the rational exconvergence is achieved. In this way, Fair and pectations hypothesis. Eckstein estimates an Taylor's estimation procedure incorporates cross-agricultural land allocation model, presuming proequation restrictions imposed from rational price ducers form price expectations rationally, using expectations, even when a closed-form solution Wallis's maximum likelihood procedure (1980) . may not exist for the rational price expectations Goodwin and Sheffrin use Wallis's MLE procefunction. In linear models, Fair and Taylor's esti-dure to estimate a rational expectations model of mation procedure yields the same results as those the U.S. broiler market. Tegene, Huffman, and obtained through maximum likelihood estimation. Miranowski use Wallis's estimation procedure to McCallum (1976 McCallum ( , 1979 and later Wickens estimate a rational expectations model for U.S. (1982) suggest an alternative "ERrors in Vari-corn supply. In each case, parameter estimates ables" (ERV) estimation method. To implement give strong support to the underlying model. the ERV method, expected values for price, quantity, and exogenous demand shifters are replaced with their realized (observed) values. Since x, is a Unobserved Price Expectations and Producer random variable correlated with v t , equation (18) is Risk Aversion now an incomplete model specification with more jointly dependent variables than equations. Esti-In this section, the simple aggregate model with mation proceeds by augmenting the redefined ver-unobserved price expectations presented above is sion of (18) with modified to include the influence of producers' risk preferences in determining aggregate supply.
x t = 0 It + t,, Since farmers do not know demand with certainty when the output decision is made, they cannot where I t is a vector of instrumental variables, 0 is know expected price with certainty. If producers a vector of parameters and ,t is a random error are risk averse, then measures of risk variables will term. The model is now completely specified. have an important influence on production deci-Equations (18) and (19) can be estimated using sions (Sandmo 1971) . either the two-stage least squares or limited-Including risk in farmers' supply equations information maximum-likelihood techniques. means farmers must form expectations on both While ERV estimation is not asymptotically effi-price and price-induced risk. The earliest models cient, the efficiency loss may be small in small included risk variables in farmers' production desamples.
cisions in an ad hoc way: they simply added an Pesaran (1987, ch. 6 and 7) considers the econ-additional term to supply representing price risk ometric identification and estimation of numerous (Behrman 1968; Just 1974 Just , 1977 Traill 1978 ). In alternative model specifications, including single-these models, supply is equation and simultaneous-equation specifica-(2) s tions, with current and forward-looking expecta-+ t + a2Wttions of endogenous and exogenous variables. + 3 tPt t Asymptotic distributions and consistent variance-where tlpv is the expected price variance at time covariance estimators are presented. Pesaran also t, conditional on information at time t -1. While discusses the relative asymptotic efficiency of the most authors do not present any justification for various estimators.
this, Antonovitz and Roe (1984) justify a similar specification as a supply function resulting from a rational expectations framework have been invessecond-order Taylor-series approximation of indi-tigated by Antonovitz and Roe (1984, 1986) , Anrect utility specified as a function of expected tonovitz and Green (1990) , Seale and Shonkwiler prices and price variances. While this justification (1987), Schroeter and Azzam (1991), Holt and is not necessarily incorrect, it seems more natural Aradhyula (1990) , and Holt (1993) . In these modthat producers maximize expected utility of prof-els, expected price and expected price variance are its. In this case, the mean and variance terms in modeled as forecasts from auxiliary equations usequation (20) should be transformed through ex-ing time series methods. Antonovitz and Roe pected profit and variance of profit, since profit is (1984, 1986) , Antonovitz and Green (1990) , and the argument of utility. In the event input prices Seale and Shonkwiler (1987) generate price and are known var(Tr) = (yS) 2 var(p) (Pope 1978) . price variance forecasts using ARIMA models. With these assumptions, the commonly used spec-Price variances are created using lagged values of ification in (20) is incorrect. squared residuals from their respective ARIMA price models. These forecasts are then used as re-Extrapolative Expectations Models gressors for expected prices and expected price variances in structural supply and demand models Adaptive Expectations. Behrman (1968) was the like equations (20) and (3). Special estimation first to adopt a supply specification like equation problems associated with this model formulation (20) . He used a fixed-length moving average of are considered in Pagan (1984) and in Pagan and squared deviations around a simple moving aver-Ullah (1988). age of the same length as the measure of expected Seale and Shonkwiler (1987) use the substituprice variance t-tp', given the information at time tion estimation procedure suggested by Wallis t -1. Just (1974) utilized the adaptive expecta-(1980) to estimate a quasi-rational expectations tions hypothesis for both price and price risk to model including risk for the U.S. watermelon marestimate supply equation (20). To operationalize ket. They estimate autoregressive models of deprice risk, Just used the standard adaptive expec-gree one to produce forecasts of exogenous varitations specification for expected price, as in equa-ables. Then they substitute these forecasts into a tion (9). He then defined subjective price risk as structural model to estimate the remaining parameters. Antonovitz and Green (1990) estimate a (21) quasi-rational expectations model including price risk for fed-beef supply also using Wallis's
Holt and Aradhyula (1990) point out that using an ARIMA process to estimate expected price variwhere ir is an unknown parameter. Just also con-ance is inconsistent with the homoskedastic varisidered the possibility that supply might be a func-ance assumption of the ARIMA model. Instead, tion of multiple expected prices, possibly includ-they suggest using Engle's ARCH (Autoregressive ing own-price and substitute prices in production. Conditional Heteroskedasticity) (1982) or Boller-Adaptive expectations of covariance can be oper-slev's GARCH (Generalized ARCH) (1986) modationalized through equation (21). els to generate forecasts of expected price and ex-Just (1974, 1977) develops a maximum likeli-pected price variance. A distinguishing feature of hood procedure for estimating (20) using the adap-these models is that forecast variance of a series is tive expectations hypothesis for expected price and allowed to vary over time. The ARCH process expected price variance. His procedure transforms conditions variance forecasts on past realizations the unobserved expectational variables conditional of the dependent variable, while the GARCH proon values of X and 7r by building price series re-cess extends the information set to include lagged cursively as in equation (11). Model parameters variances of the dependent variable. Using a modare then estimated using OLS. A grid search is ified GARCH (1,1) model to form forecasts of performed over X and rr to obtain their maximum price and price variance, Holt and Aradhyula estilikelihood values. Empirical studies by Just (1974, mate a supply model for the U.S. broiler industry. 1977), Traill (1978) , Hurt and Garcia (1982) , and While their estimated supply equation compares Brorsen, Chavas, and Grant (1987) have found favorably with one estimated using Just's adaptive that risk terms are important in aggregate supply expectations framework, the question of which functions.
model is better is left unanswered.
Quasi-Rational Expectations with Risk Aver-
A number of authors have utilized price and sion. The effects of price uncertainty in the quasi-price variance forecasts from ARCH or GARCH processes in structural models of supply and de- (26) Byt -Al(B + A 1 )-'lwt,_ mand. Structural parameters are estimated using -A(B + Al)-lr 2 Et lxt the substitution method procedure suggested by - Wallis (1980) or using the instrumental variable+ procedure suggested by Pagan (1984) . Schroeter This model can be estimated using the methods outlined in the econometric estimation of rational Rational Expectations Models expectations models above. Pagan (1984) discusses some special estimation problems associated with estimating the covariance terms in ar t. The effects of price uncertainty in the rational ex-Using Fair and Taylor's estimation procedure pectations framework have been investigated by (1983) , Aradhyula and Holt (1989) estimate the Aradhyula and Holt (1989) . The simple rational fully specified model given in equation (26) for the expectations model represented in equation (14) U.S. broiler market. can be modified to include variance by adding the Rational Expectations with Bounded Prices. Reterm A 2 tlyt. Equation (14) then becomes cently Maddala (1983) , Shonkwiler and Maddala (1985) , Holt and Johnson (1989) , and Holt (1992) (22) Byt + Al t -lY + A 2 t-lYv have considered rational expectations models + 'rlw, + r 2 xt = Vt' where prices are bounded. Bounded prices often Utilizing the rational expectations hypothesis, the arise in agricultural markets where government inprice risk specification is derived from underlying tervenes to guarantee producers a minimum price. model parameters. Following Aradhyula and Holt, If market price is above the support level, producthe rational expectation of variance can be deers get the prevailing market price and government fined as takes no action in the market. If market price falls below the support price, government intervenes in (23) t-lYt = diag{E,_- [(y, -Et-l(ytlft-O)] the market by purchasing commodities to raise [Yt -Et-(Ytl [-1 )]'}, price to support level. Hence, the market alternates where -,_iy is defined as a vector of expected between equilibrium and disequilibrium. Governvariances for relevant endogenous variables condiment intervention creates an effective lower bound tional on information avail t poducers' ration availabl price expectat time t-1.
ions and creexact expression for equation (23) is formed in ates a situation where no closed-form solution for three steps.
Step 1 is to find an expression for the rational price expectations function, equation t_ly e as in equation (16). Step 2 is to subtract (16) exists. ,_ ye from the reduced form representation of y, Maddala (1983) proposes a two-stage tobit esti-(a modified form of equation (15): mator to deal with the two price regimes. In the first stage, a tobit model is used to obtain price (24) (y, -
predictions. In the second stage, expected price is + B-1V .
replaced with price predictions from the tobit equation, and two-stage least squares estimation is ap-Step 3 is to use the result from step 2 to compute plied to an augmented structural supply and detly from equation (23). These steps result in the mand model. Additional terms are included in the rational expectations predictor of variances of enestimating equation to correct for nonspherical disdogenous variables:
turbances. Maddala's estimation procedure pro-
mates. Shonkwiler and Maddala (1985) assume the "+ B-1 1B )
producers have perfect foresight with respect to where "I, is the variance-covariance matrix assoperiods when price supports are effective. This asciated with the predictions of demand shifters x t . sumption allows them to use standard substitution Equation (25) can now be substituted into the exestimation procedures. They compare perfect forepression for t,_yt to eliminate terms involving sight results with Maddala's two-step tobit estimat-Y. Together t-ly and t_-y can be substituted tor. Holt and Johnson (1989) and Holt (1992) both into equation (22) to obtain the following estimat-use Fair and Taylor's estimation procedure deable system of equations:
scribed earlier, which is directly adapted to the numeric formulation of the price expectations model given in (27) and jointly testing the restricfunction. tions (Hoffman and Schmidt, 1981) : ries of tests are available to evaluate a particular Goodwin and Sheffrin (1982) apply the likeliprice expectations hypothesis with respect to actual hood ratio test to a model of the U.S. broiler inmarket data. The first is for consistency of the dustry and cannot reject the null hypothesis that expectations mechanism within the structural price expectations are formed rationally. However, model. Tests in this category simply ascertain .
. model. Tests in this category simply ascertain it should be noted that tests like the ones above are whether the expectations mechanism is consistent conditional on the correct specification of the unwith observed behavior as constructed in the ecostructural model. derlying structural model. nomic model. The second category consists of nonnested model selection tests designed to allow Testing across Expectations Regimes Using the researcher to select the expectations regime Nonnested Tests that best fits agent behavior in a particular market.
As discussed in the introduction, when information Testin for .TT C c collection and processing are costly, any number Testing for Within-Model Consistency of expectations mechanisms can potentially reflect a producer's actual expectations. Several authors Extrapolative Expectations. Naive and adaptive have investigated this possibility in various comprice expectations mechanisms do not impose modity markets (Goodwin and Sheffrin 1982; cross-equation parameter restrictions on supply Orazem and Miranowski 1986; Antonovitz and and demand equations. Therefore, in contrast to Green 1990). A number of nonnested hypothesis rational expectations models, there are no direct tests are available for distinguishing which price tests of internal consistency that will reject or fail expectations regime producers are actually utilizto reject naive expectations when expectations are ing not directly observed.
Alternative expectations models can be artifi-A weak test for within-model validity of adapcially nested to determine whether any hypothetive expectations, in the absence of directly obsized expectations regime dominates all other served expectations, is whether X lies on the unit specifications. Care must be taken to maintain the interval. same production and demand structures so that Rational Expectations. The rational expectaonly the parameterization of each expectation retions hypothesis imposes cross-equation structural gime differs between models. Selection of the exrestrictions on model parameters. If the restrictions pectation regime consistent with behavioral data imposed by the rational expectations hypothesis can then be based on model specification tests, cannot be rejected, the rational expectations hy-including Davidson and MacKinnon's J-test pothesis cannot be rejected. The statistical validity (1981), Mizon and Richard's encompassing prinof cross-equation parameter restrictions imposed ciple (1986), and Pollak and Wales's likelihood by the rational expectations hypothesis can be dominance criterion (1991) . evaluated through standard hypothesis testing pro-J-test. Suppose there are two competing expeccedures (Hoffman and Schmidt 1981 ; Revankar tations hypotheses: t_ pe, (adaptive expectations) 1980). A likelihood-ratio test can be computed by and ,_ l2, (rational expectations). Assuming that estimating the restricted model using the substituthe first price expectations hypothesis is true, t-_ tion method maximum-likelihood estimator and = tit, the null hypothesis can be written as estimating the unrestricted model using standard FIML, where the unrestricted model is given by: versus the alternative hypothesis that t-lPt
The number of restrictions is equal to the number _ e . of parameters in equation (27) Since Ha cannot be written as a restriction on H 0 , wise comparisons are, as in Antonovitz and Green, nested hypothesis tests are not possible. However, inconclusive and conflicting. Davidson and MacKinnon (1981) (30) and (31), and a fictional composite hypothesis H c that This test is conditional on the truth of the hypoth-nests Ho and Ha. Let L 0 , La and Lc denote the log esis t-lPt = t-Piet; we cannot infer the truth of likelihood values associated with each hypothesis. Ha from 8. However, the process can be reversed Let C(v) denote the critical values of the chi-square so that t_ 1Pt = t-Pt is taken as the truth. In distribution with v degrees of freedom and a fixed total, four possibilities must be checked: reject significance level. Using a likelihood-ratio test, is easily implemented. Shideed and White (1989) also use the J-test to Summary. Neither Antonovitz and Green (1990) compare six alternative expectation formulations nor Shideed and White (1989) could support any for prices of corn and soybeans: naive, futures particular expectations specification using the prices, effective expected support prices, a combi-J-test. Likewise, Orazem and Miranowski's results nation of lagged cash and support prices, a com-(1986) were inconclusive, finding only marginal bination of futures prices and lagged support support for the quasi-rational expectations hypothprices, and a Koyck lag model. The results of pair-esis. However, nonnested tests have relatively low power, and inconclusive results are not unusual power of the rationally expected price. Goodwin (Judge et al. 1985, 885) . Neither the encompassing and Sheffrin argue that futures market price data principle nor the likelihood dominance criterion should include all available information in the marhas yet been used to distinguish price expectations ketplace. Hence, a test of the rational expectations mechanisms.
hypothesis can be performed using regression model
where Pt is realized price, t-,_ is the price fore-Goodwin and Sheffrin (1982) construct two tests to cast through the rational price expectations mechcompare alternative expectations regimes: a pre-anism for time t given the information at time tdiction test and a futures market test. These tests i, and t-it is the future price at time t -i for are valid only for the maintained null hypothesis delivery at time t. If the rational expectations hythat expectations are formed rationally.
pothesis is valid, Ho will not be rejected: Ho: a o = Predictive R 2 . Goodwin and Sheffrin's predic-a 2 = 0. o 1 is not required to equal 1 because of tion test (1982) is based on the relative predictive transportation costs from a local market to a conefficiency of rationally formed expectations that tract delivery point and because product form use all available information versus less efficient (e.g., iced broiler meat versus live chickens) may extrapolative price expectations models that use differ between cash price pt and futures price pf. information contained only in past prices. Pierce Goodwin and Sheffrin (1982) estimate equation (1975) defines a measure of this efficiency called (40) using OLS and cannot reject the rational price "the predictive R+": expectations hypothesis. However, in general,
MSE~ -MSE*
'-ti
where It is a random error term pos-+ MSE ' sibly correlated with et, OLS estimations of (40) E is the extrapolative mean squared error will be biased and inconsistent. In addition, since andwher MSE is the rational expectations mean futures market prices are contained in the informasquared M error. R measures the proportion tion set used in forming rational expectations, it is + eeo ar hpproo not clear whether Goodwin and Sheffrin's test is variation in a variable that is generated by utilizing a rate Pagan (1984) suggests estimating the structural information versus variation in the vari-a oate. Pagan ( sggests estiti te able generated using only own-price history.
in g the two-step approach detailed above. Goodwin and Sheffrin estimate models of the U.S. broiler market using adaptive, quasi-rational, and Summary rational price expectations regimes. Using the R criterion, they find superior efficiency in the ratio-Not surprisingly, empirical results concerning nal expectations hypothesis. However, they do not which price expectations mechanisms are actually test for unbiasedness, another requirement of the being used are inconclusive. Inability of these rational expectations hypothesis. models to distinguish actual producer price expec-Although widely used, forecast evaluation tests tations mechanisms may result from aggregation are valid only for a maintained null of rational bias. When information is costly, information sets expectations. Unbiasedness and efficiency are ba-differ, and individuals begin the expectations prosic tenets of the rational expectations hypothesis. cess with different educational and analytic en-Therefore, if producers' expectations are biased or dowments, it is not reasonable to suppose an aginefficient, they are not rationally generated. How-gregate "representative farmer" price expectaever, there is no such accuracy or efficiency re-tions model will be valid. If producers have quirement for other expectations mechanisms. The heterogeneous expectations, then an aggregate predictive ability of an expectations mechanism model may not capture reality well enough to promight be the deciding factor when information is vide good statistical results. In particular, strong unlimited and costless. However, when informa-assumptions are made in the use of aggregate data. tion is costly, a farmer may choose a biased or less Tests of producer expectations mechanisms then efficient mechanism.
incorporate these assumptions as part of the main-Futures Market. Goodwind and Sheffrin (1982) tained hypothesis of model structure. also construct a rational expectations test based on For example, to derive a simple structural model futures market data. According to the rational ex-with stochastic output prices that admits the pospectations hypothesis, no information available at sibility of risk aversion similar to equation (20) the time of the forecast should add to the predictive requires numerous assumptions. First, assume that price is normally distributed and that farmer i's gregate. Agents must hypothesize aggregate modutility is characterized by constant absolute risk els based on the information at hand and will likely aversion. Maximizing expected utility is then consider their own technologies and utilities. Indiequivalent to maximizing the certainty equivalent viduals may aggregate supply by presuming that of profit E[U(Tai)] (Hildreth 1954; Freund 1956) : technology, information, and risk attitudes of all other producers are the same as their own. Farmers Al___ might also believe that others in the market are (41) E[U(Ti)] = E(rrTi) -2 forming their expectations rationally and will forecast the same price and price variance as they do. where E(ri) is expected profit and (-. is the profit These or similar assumptions are necessary for ravariance perceived by farmer i. Alternatively, Fartional expectations models. rar (1962) and others have justified equation (41) Given these assumptions, ci(w t _ ) = c(wt,_), as a Taylor-series expansion of the utility of exh i = X, ,t-= t-1t, and t-pit = t-,_t. As a pected profit.
result, aggregate supply is the sum over individual Equation (41) can be expanded to supplies
and F is fixed inputs. In order to aggregate across where M is the number of producers and is the producers, cost functions must be either identical mean error term with an expected value of zero. mean error term with an expected value of zero. or of some aggregatable form such as the Grman To form rational expectations, producers must polar form, Cit = yitci(w,_,) + F. also know aggregate demand, equation (3). Aggre-Each farmer chooses yi to maximize expected gate supply can then be combined with aggregate utility of profits: demand to form model-consistent price and price (43) variance expectations. While little is known about how producers might actually perform these com-aE[U(rit)] e putations, it is clear that numerous assumptions -y t-Piti(Wt-_) -YitXi t-iPit must be maintained in the estimation of rational expectations models.
Eit,
To investigate the possibility that producers may where eit is a small error with mean zero resulting have heterogenous price expectations, we now turn from errors in specifying the true optimization our attention to studies focused on discovering inproblem (McElroy 1987) . If firm-level data are dividuals' price expectations mechanisms. To available for input prices and output quantity, date, studies concerning individuals' price expecequation (43) can be estimated to recover the util-tations have been based solely on survey data. ity parameter h i and technology parameters in c,(.) First, we review some test procedures used in by substituting in an agent's expectation mecha-panel data studies. Then we consider some new nism for price and price variance. Substituting ex-test procedures that could be implemented when trapolative price expectations mechanisms into firm-level data, including price expectations sur-(43) is straightforward. No other assumptions are veys, are available. necessary.
However, in the case of rational expectations, Selecting Expectations Regimes When producers' price expectations are the objective Expected Price Is Observed price expectations from the market given their information sets at production planning time. One of the pitfalls of hypothesis tests within struc-Though expectations are formed individually, an tural models is that it is nearly impossible to sepaggregate model is required. Rational expectations arate errors in the expectations mechanism from requires each individual to assess aggregate supply errors that exist in the structural model (Jacobs and and demand conditions and to forecast price and Jones 1980). Hypothesis testing within the context price variance based on his perception of that ag-of a structural model is necessarily conditional on model structure, presenting a serious limitation for larger than the expected price variance. This sugtesting the rational expectations hypothesis within gests a second test: var(p,) > var(,_pi). the structural model context. As an alternative, Third, the "weak rationality" concept (Nelson several authors have turned to direct tests of un-and Bessler 1992; Sargent 1982; Lovell 1986) imderlying price expectations that use survey data. plies that the error term et should be uncorrelated Some tests use aggregate (mean) survey measures with the information available in historic price levof expectations, while others use individual panel els at the time the forecast is made. This hypothdata. esis can be tested using the regression equation When expectations are observed, as in the case where survey data exist, direct tests to distinguish (48) Pi = o + 11 r-iPP + l12 Pt-i + Vt, economic agents' expectations mechanisms are where 'To, Al and T12 are parameters and u t is an possible. For instance, a direct test of naive price error term. A third hypothesis test for rational exexpectations is to obtain regression coefficients for pectations is thus Ho: Tr 2 = 0. the model A variation of the weak rationality hypothesis e _ + test is presented by Pesando (1975) . He suggests (45) ,-iPt = 0o+ Pt-_ + 1t, running the following two regressions: where u t -N(0,c2) and the expected price t_ ipe is taken directly from the survey data. A hypothesis ( in the historic price. Carlson (1977) suggests a where the wj's are geometrically declining similar test. weights. There is no direct test for adaptive expec-
The F-test requires that errors v 1 and v 2 be identations since no hypothesis can be constructed tically and independently distributed. Pesando from survey data alone to test whether the data are (1975) acknowledges, and Mullineaux (1978) furconsistent with the adaptive expectations hypothe-ther argues, that there are reasons to believe the sis.
errors in equations (49) and (50) will not be homoskedastic. Mullineaux suggests that Bartlett's Rational Expectations statistic testing variance homogeneity is a neces-Rational Expectations sary companion to Pesando's and Carlson's techniques. Several tests are available to determine whether the Recently, the problem of possible nonstationarrational expectations mechanism is consistent with ity of Pt and ,ip has received attention. Fischer survey data. First, the rational expectations hy-(1989) develops several necessary conditions for pothesis implies that expected prices should be un-survey data to be generated from rational forecasts. biased. The restriction can be checked using the He argues that preliminary tests for unit roots and regression equation cointegration are crucial before rationality of sur-Pe vey data can be established and recommends first (47) Pt = To + TI E (47) P= To + TI t-iPt + et, testing the order of integration for t_ ipt and p,. If where To and T' are parameters and e, is an error pt -I(c), t_-p -I(d) and c # d, where I(d) term with E(e) = 0. Testing for unbiased expec-indicates order of integration, then _ -lp cannot be tations means testing Ho: To = 0, TI = 1 (Fried-a rational forecast of p. If _ Pt, Pt -I(d) and d > man 1980). 0, then cointegration between t_ -pe and pt can be Second, for Muth rational expectations, et must tested. If the data series are cointegrated, tests for be uncorrelated with the expected price ,-lp'-weak-form rational expectations can be performed Since the error term is correlated with the realized using residuals of the constrained cointegration reprice, Pt, the realized price variance should be gression. Failure to pretest for unit roots may result in invalid inference concerning tests for weak-(55) F,+k = %o + o t,+kFe + r x t + E,, rationality. Engsted (1991) tests for rationality in w e where F,+, are actual farrowings at t + k,, +, survey data of inflation expectations in the United k a c are farmers' planned farrowings for t + k at time Kingdom using the cointegration approach. By us Kingdom using the cointegration approach By us-are farmers' planned farrowings for t + k at time ing cointegration and en t s t, and x, is a vector of variables containing forecast ing cointegration and error-correction techniques, i information at time t. Parameters aot, oi,a and P Engsted shows that weak-rationality cannot be re-.
. m s ' .Jected.
can be consistently estimated using Hansen's genjected.ni~~~~~ 1-101i. eralized-method-of-moments estimator (1982) . Mullineaux (1978) further suggests another test eralized-etodo oents estimor for wk r l. E s () ad () cn Runkle's strong rationality test requires orthogofor weak rationality. Equations (49) and (50) can be combined through subtraction: nality of estimated regression residuals to each rebe combined through subtraction: gressor in the model. Results indicate that neither (51) (p, -p P-) = the one-quarter-ahead nor the two-quarters-ahead farrowing intentions are rational forecasts of actual Eales et al. (1990) use survey data from farmers or and grain merchandisers to investigate the extent to which subjective respondent's price distributions (52) Ap, = 80 + 8lPt-1 + 82Pr-2 reflect actual futures and options price distribu-+ · · · + AnPt-n + (. tions. Not surprisingly, they find agreement be-Weak rationality implies that 60 = 8 = 82 = .. tween respondent's expected price and futures = 8, = 0. Mullineaux's formulation specifically price. However, they also find strong evidence of allows a constant term and allows nested hypoth-systematic disagreement between respondents and esis testing.
the market with respect to variance forecasts. Fourth, "strong rationality" (Lovell 1986) requires that the error term be uncorrelated with any Panel Data Studies and Some Pitfalls piece of information available at the time of the forecast whether or not this information has been There are a number of possible difficulties in testcaptured in past prices. This rationality concept is ing for rational expectations using survey data. also called "sufficient expectations" (Lovell Keane and Runkle (1990) maintain that most tests 1986) since expectations must be based on all in-in the literature are incorrect. First, they assert that formation available at the time the expected price the use of average survey responses rather than is formed. One hypothesis test for this involves individual micro data can bias hypothesis tests by estimating leading to false rejection of the rational expecta-
, -p = f(X, p ) + e tions hypothesis. Individual forecasts are necessar-' ' " ^~ ' ~ ily predicated on different information sets. Thus, and tests based on aggregated data, such as an average (^ _ ~54)~ -~ X~ n +survey response, are conditional on a set of infor-
P, = f(X,, [2) e+ ,t, mation sets, not a single shared information set. where P1 and p2 are parameter sets, X, is an in-Aggregation nullifies the single information set asformation set, and E t , E t are error terms. For ex-sumption required for expectations to be strongly pectations to be rational in a structural model, the rational. As a result, standard tests for expectaexpected price must be related to the exogenous tions' unbiasedness might be falsely accepted. Alvariables in the same way as the realized price. In ternatively, aggregation may lead to a failure to other words, the two variables must follow the reject the rational expectations hypothesis because same autoregressive process (Turnovsky 1970) . aggregation may mask individual forecaster's bi-The test is thus H 0 : p, = 1 2. While Turnovsky ases. performs this test using time series analysis, a sim-Aggregation bias may also result from using ilar test could be implemented for structural mod-pooled cross-sectional time-series expectations els where equations (53) and (54) are taken as survey data. Goodfriend (1992) points out that price-dependent supply equations. Abel and agents have randomly heterogeneous and imper-Mishkin (1983) present an integrated view of tests fectly informed expectations. In pooled panel data for rational expectations and show the equivalence studies, this may result in a stochastic regressor of many of the above procedures.
problem arising from correlation between the sur-Runkle (1991) tests for strong rationality using veyed price expectation and error term. Adapting aggregate U.S. sow farrowing data. He estimates aggregate supply equation (1) (Keane and Runkle 1990) . where a', ai, and a 2 are parameters for agent i, Keane and Runkle (1990) , Lovell (1986), Pe-t_ -pe is the price expected by agent i, w t _ is a sando (1975), Carlson (1977) , Mullineaux (1978) , vector of input prices, ort is a vector of parameters Knobl (1974) , Nerlove (1983) , Colling, Irwin, and common for all agents, and e' is an error term. If Zulauf (1992), Frankel and Froot (1987) , Runkle the number of time-series observations is large, (1991), and Eales et al. (1990) have used survey and conditions Cov(, t _ p Ei , e') = 0 and data to test price expectations regimes. Holden, Cov(w t _ ,e) = 0 hold, OLS will produce consis-Peel, and Thompson (1985) , and more recently tent parameter estimates for al, a 2 , and a 3 and ct 2 Zarnowitz (1992, ch. 16), review numerous studfor each individual. However, in the usual case ies that test expectations formation of macroecowhere the observations per individual are few, nomic variables including inflation and interest consistent parameter estimates require the et's be rates using survey data. Most studies narrowly founcorrelated across individuals as well. In the cus on testing the rational expectations hypothesis, strong rational expectations case, the et's are un-though Knobl (1974), Nerlove (1983) , and Frankel correlated across time for a particular individual, and Froot (1987) do consider other mechanisms. but there is no condition on errors across agents. In Generally, survey-based tests of the rational exfact, continual small shocks to the economy make pectations hypothesis reject unbiasedness: the it highly likely that the ','s will be correlated weakest requirement for rationality. Other studies across agents, which will cause information-fail to reject stronger forms of the rational expecaggregation bias in models using pooled panel tations hypothesis. This ambiguity of results has data.
led Lovell (1986) to suggest that alternative expec-One possible method to deal with information-tations mechanisms be evaluated against each aggregation bias is suggested by Zeldes (1989) . other. However, to date, few studies have sought Wave dummies can be used to capture an aggre-to distinguish alternative expectations regimes usgate price expectations component. For example, ing survey data. Goodfriend (1992) suggests using individual's variation from aggregate expectation in disaggre-Summary gated supply equations like (56). Using this technique, all commonality in individual expectations A major reason survey-based studies have focused is purged. However, the purging process may re-almost exclusively on testing the rational expectasult in the false inference that agents do not make tions hypothesis is their inability to distinguish alefficient use of information, a condition that could ternative price expectations mechanisms using lead to false rejection of the rational expectations only survey data for expected price and price rehypothesis (Goodfriend 1992). alization data. Given only price information, re-Using revised data in model estimation may also searchers are restricted to testing unbiasedness and bias hypothesis tests and parameter estimates efficiency of respondents' price forecasts when (Keane and Runkle 1990) . Often, data are revised compared with actual price realizations. These are after producer's planning decisions. At the time characteristics of the rational expectations hypothproducers form price expectations, their informa-esis, but not necessarily of extrapolative expectation sets contain the original data release. When tions mechanisms. To distinguish among the myrtesting for rational expectations, care should be iad of expectations mechanisms, it is necessary to taken to use the exact information set available at add more economic structure. the forecast time, without revisions that have been
To test a broad spectrum of expectations mechmade to information in the intervening period be-anisms, including those that do not require unbitween forecast and academic research. asedness or efficiency, it is necessary to cast hy-Survey instruments purport to measure what an pothesis tests concerning price expectations mechindividual is thinking, but responses are generally anisms in terms of producers' choice variables. without consequences to the respondent. This is in The price expectation mechanism resulting in contrast to market data, which are gathered from model predictions that most closely correspond to observing what individuals actually do. In surveys, observed behavior can be accepted as the one to there is no incentive for respondents to correctly which producers are actually adhering. Since price reveal their expectations nor any way to mitigate expectations in commodity markets affect producsuch problems as interviewer-induced bias, survey tion, it is reasonable to cast hypotheses concerning instrument-induced bias, etc. Hence, any conclu-price expectations mechanisms in terms of supply. sions about individuals' expectations resulting This can be achieved through the nonnested model specification tests discussed in the previous sec-hypothesis tests that are available using only surtion. vey data. In the future, a hypothesis test strategy When survey data are available, a benchmark that combines observed firm-level data with survey model comprised of supply (56) and demand (3) data of producer price expectations may be used to can be estimated directly using the survey data for distinguish each producer's adherence to a particexpected price and expected price variance. The ular price expectations mechanism. In the final benchmark model can then be tested against each analysis, each market participant has to make his alternative price expectations mechanism by (1) own guess about what the future will bring. Some substituting the assumed price expectation function will take great care in making their projections; into supply, (2) estimating the model as if price others will not. It seems unlikely that all individexpectations were not observed, and (3) using non-uals will follow the same rule. nested model specification tests to determine whether the benchmark model dominates the hypothesized model. In addition, forecast tests can be References used to test the validity of each price expectation mechanism against surveyed expected values. Abel, A., and F.S. Mishkin. 1983 gimes, their estimation, and the hypothesis tests gimes, their estimation, and the hypothesis tests Antonovitz, F., and R. Green. 1990 . "Alternative Estimates of that have been applied to determine their accep-FedBeefSupplyResponsetoRisk."American Journal of 
